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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No: 04-2689
                                 
MICHAEL SOLIN, by and
through his parents and
attorneys-in-fact;
BARRY SOLIN; PATRICIA SOLIN
   v.
RIVERTON BOROUGH BOARD OF EDUCATION;
PALMYRA BOROUGH BOARD OF EDUCATION
     Riverton Borough
     Board of Education,
                          Appellant
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 04-cv-00147)
District Judge: Joseph E. Irenas
                                                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on June 28, 2005
Before: ROTH, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:    August 15, 2005)
2_______________
OPINION
________________
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
B.S. on behalf of M.S. brought an action against the Palmyra Borough Board of
Education and the Riverton Borough Board of Education (the School Boards) seeking
relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in the form of
payment by the School Boards for the expenses associated with M.S.’s education at a
private school.  State administrative review of M.S.’s claim by a state administrative law
judge (ALJ) awarded M.S. some of the relief he sought.  Seeking further relief under the
IDEA, M.S. brought an action in federal district court.  Although district court
proceedings have yet to conclude, the District Court awarded M.S. part of the relief
sought:  the District Court ordered the School Boards to continue payments to M.S.’s
private school during the pendency of this litigation.  This is the so-called “stay-put”
order.  The School Boards have complied with the stay-put order, but the School Board of
Riverton has sought an interlocutory appeal in an effort to recoup funds already expended
in compliance with the District Court’s order.  M.S. has since graduated.  For the reasons
we explain below, the School Board’s appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate
jurisdiction. 
3Factual Background and Procedural History
As the facts are well known to the parties, we give only a brief description of the
facts and procedural posture of the case.  
M.S. attended the TLC school in Connecticut during 2002-2003.  His placement
there was a decision of a “child study team.”  Apparently, this assessment was an
individualized education program as set out in the IDEA.  The School Boards sought to
have M.S. graduate in June 2003, but his parents (who initiated litigation) sought an
additional year for M.S. at TLC.  M.S. was granted interim relief in a June 30, 2003, order
issued by the ALJ.  Due process hearings were held and the ALJ issued a final order on
December 16, 2003.  The ALJ’s final order awarded M.S. placement at TLC through the
fall 2003 semester, but thereafter M.S. could finish his last remaining course -- physics --
at public school, thereby terminating the School Boards’ financial obligation for
continuing costs at TLC.  M.S. appealed the ALJ’s order by bringing a federal district
court action on January 14, 2004.  The School Board of Riverton brought a counterclaim. 
On May 10, 2004, the District Court issued a stay-put order, maintaining the then current
educational placement at TLC and assigning the costs of M.S.’s education at TLC
incurred during the pendency of the litigation to the School Boards.  In prior briefing
before the District Court, the School Board of Riverton took the position that its financial
straits would justify the District Court in denying M.S. the stay-put order sought by M.S. 
The District Court rejected this argument.  Litigation on the merits of the claims and
4counterclaims continue even now before the District Court.  Notwithstanding continuing
District Court proceedings, the School Board filed its notice of appeal on June 10, 2004,
seeking interlocutory relief with regard to the District Court’s stay-put order.  M.S.
graduated in June 2004. 
Standard of Review and Jurisdiction
As we deny the School Board all relief for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we do not
review any of the findings or proceedings of the District Court.  Our authority to
determine the extent of our own jurisdiction is plenary.  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and IDEA, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400 et seq.  The School Board argues that (interlocutory) appellate jurisdiction exists
under the collateral order doctrine and cite this court’s holding in Susquenita School
District v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 81 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) as support.  
We distinguish the facts of Susquenita from the case before us.  In Susquenita, the
District Court, per the IDEA, ordered that Raelee S. be permitted to continue her
education in the private school she had been attending and ordered the school district to
make payments against prospective costs.  See Susquenita, 96 F.3d at 81 & n.3. 
Additionally, the District Court ordered the school district to reimburse Raelee S. for
costs already incurred during 1994-1995 term, which was ninth grade for Raelee S.  The
District Court’s order was filed in 1995.  Appeal was taken and we announced our
decision in 1996 – finding jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 81 n.4. 
5At that time, Raelee S. would have just started eleventh grade.  In other words, both
Raelee S.’s suit on the merits (still before the District Court in 1996) and the continuing
obligation of the school district to make further or prospective payments under the order
from which the interlocutory appeal was taken remained live controversies.  Had the
school district been denied interlocutory review until the District Court issued its final
order on the merits of the IDEA action, the school district’s ability to legally test the
validity of the stay-put order and to avoid the concomitant and continuing financial
obligations would have been impossible.  Appellate review at the termination of all
district court proceedings might impair the school district’s ability to recoup some or all
of the funds it continued to expend in compliance with the stay-put order.  Interlocutory
review had the potential of avoiding this result precisely because Raelee S. was still in
school.  
In the instant litigation, M.S. has already graduated.  There is no live controversy
with regard to Riverton and Palmyra’s continuing financial obligations under the stay-put
order.  M.S.’s claim for prospective relief is moot.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the School Board’s appeal is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.   
